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56 
CLASS ACTIONS, CIVIL RIGHTS,  
AND THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION† 
Suzette M. Malveaux∗ 
Professor Samuel Bray, in Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the Na-
tional Injunction,1 tackles one of the most salient issues of our modern 
legal system: the propriety of the national injunction.  Over the last few 
decades, federal district court judges have increasingly issued injunc-
tions that halt important policies and executive orders promulgated un-
der both Republican and Democrat administrations.  Bray’s Article con-
cludes that, under Article III of the Constitution and traditional 
principles of equity, federal district court judges may apply their rulings 
to the parties before them but not to nonparties. 
Consequently, Bray proposes a course correction, a rule that prohib-
its federal judges from issuing injunctions that enjoin defendant’s con-
duct with respect to nonparties.  He concludes “[n]o matter how im-
portant the question and no matter how important the value of 
uniformity, a federal court should not award a national injunction.”2  
Period. 
Bray’s Article makes the important contribution of identifying the 
national injunction as a recent phenomenon in equity history and pro-
poses a rule that will provoke an important conversation about the 
power of the courts vis-à-vis the executive branch.  However, as attrac-
tive as a bright-line rule against national injunctions might be, I can’t 
agree with this solution.  It is too blunt an instrument to address the 
complexity of our tripartite system of government, our pluralistic soci-
ety, and our democracy.  Moreover, Article III and traditional equitable 
principles give judges considerable discretion that enables them to craft 
remedies that touch nonparties.  Although national injunctions are im-
perfect and crude forms of justice, they are better than no justice at 
all — which for some actions, may be the alternative. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 † Responding to Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017). 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. 
 1 Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
417 (2017).  This Response analyzes the potential consequences of Bray’s blanket prohibition on 
national injunctions and argues normatively why his prohibition should be rejected.  A full analysis 
of the federal judiciary’s power under Article III and traditional equity to order national injunctions 
is beyond the scope of this shorter work. 
 2 Id. at 420. 
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I.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION 
The meat of Bray’s Article is, of course, his exploration of the draw-
backs of the modern national injunction and the alleged failure of courts 
to impose proper limits when determining remedial relief.  To Bray, the 
national injunction should be avoided because it leads to forum shop-
ping,3 poor judicial decisionmaking,4 and doctrinal inconsistencies.5  All 
are valid concerns, but not grounds for the complete elimination of the 
national injunction. 
A.  Forum Shopping 
First, Bray’s illustration of how the national injunction leads liti-
gants to forum shop is indisputable.  As Bray aptly notes, litigants can 
“[s]hop ’til the statute drops”6 and have done so deftly.  Forum shopping 
is hardly new and, in fact, the American legal system tacitly encourages 
it7 with its charge that lawyers zealously represent their clients within 
the bounds of the law.  While some may have a visceral distaste for the 
practice, in a conflict resolution system that requires a certain degree of 
adversity,8 it should come as no surprise that litigants take advantage of 
fora that lean one way or another.  Forum shopping is just one example 
of how the plaintiff is the master of his own claim.9  But to the extent 
that forum shopping is the vice, it is not solved by an anti-injunction 
rule.10  Bray puts forth the class action as an alternative to the national 
injunction,11 but forum shopping for courts hospitable to class actions 
is also common.12  Thus, Bray’s rule leaves this problem intact. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 Id. at 457–61. 
 4 Id. at 461–62. 
 5 Id. at 464–65.  He also identifies conflicting injunctions, but concedes that this is less common.  
Id. at 462–64. 
 6 Id. at 460. 
 7 See J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE 
L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) (positing that forum shopping is “a national legal pastime”); Note, Forum 
Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) (arguing that many activities in-
volved in forum shopping are “integral to the legal system”). 
 8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 94–97 (1968). 
 9 See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1987) (master-of-complaint doctrine); 
see also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). 
 10 Bray, supra note 1, at 460 n.252 (noting that forum shopping would still take place in individ-
ual cases via the venue statute); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012). 
 11 Bray, supra note 1, at 475–76. 
 12 See, e.g., Shrey Sharma, Note, Do the Second Circuit’s Legal Standards on Class Certification 
Incentivize Forum Shopping?: A Comparative Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Class Certification 
Jurisprudence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 877 (2016) (comparing class certification standards across 
circuits). 
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B.  Judicial Decisionmaking 
Second, Bray makes the important point that national injunctions 
undermine good decisionmaking by cutting short the ability of courts to 
have competing rulings percolate up to the Supreme Court for resolu-
tion.13  Instead, a complex legal issue reaches the Court “accelerated and 
relatively fact-free.”14  I agree that this is not ideal.  However, there are 
occasions when an issue is sufficiently ripe and particularly pressing 
such that it should be ruled on sooner rather than later. 
Bray minimizes the fact that reducing delay and uncertainty and 
creating stability are significant countervailing interests to the “value in 
percolation,”15 especially where individuals’ lives and fundamental 
rights hang in the balance.  Deportation of immigrants, travel bans im-
plicating national security, and keeping families intact and protected un-
der the law16 are instances where the courts may justifiably feel greater 
urgency and a reluctance to hold an executive order in limbo.  Indeed, 
many of the recent national injunctions have stemmed from such crisis 
moments.17  In these instances where so many risk irreparable harm, it 
behooves the Court to ask: How much time and how many decisions 
are reasonable for percolation?  How important are factual records 
when the Court is ruling on the validity of a government’s uniform con-
duct or policy?  And how justified is delay in the face of instability, 
uncertainty, and harm that may result?  Incrementalism has its costs 
too. 
C.  Rule 23(b)(2) 
Finally, Bray criticizes the national injunction for its potential to un-
dermine Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18  This 
provision allows injunctive relief while requiring certain due process 
safeguards.  Bray goes further than necessary in concluding that “the 
implication is that the remedy is available only if those conditions are 
met.”19  Although the point is overstated, Bray appropriately recognizes 
the utility of the modern class action rule.  However, his suggestion that 
Rule 23(b)(2) provides a ready alternative to the national injunction is 
flawed. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Bray, supra note 1, at 461–62. 
 14 Id. at 461. 
 15 Id. (quoting Harold Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 
AM. U. L. REV. 881, 907 (1975)). 
 16 See id. at 418–19, 457–60 (describing such injunctions). 
 17 Id. at 418–19. 
 18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 19 Bray, supra note 1, at 464. 
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In 1966, the rulemakers crafted Rule 23(b)(2) with the express goal 
of empowering litigants challenging systemic discrimination — particu-
larly segregation — to force courts to order widespread injunctive relief 
that would protect the class as a whole.20  Over a half century later,  
this civil rights class action provision remains as salient to the enforce-
ment of federal civil rights statutes and constitutional claims as at its 
inception.21 
But despite Rule 23(b)(2)’s important function of enabling broad in-
junctive relief for a class while safeguarding due process, the Court’s 
contemporary jurisprudence has made it more difficult for litigants chal-
lenging discrimination to act collectively.22  Further, at the same time 
the Advisory Committee is eschewing large scale Rule 23 reform, Con-
gress has proposed numerous amendments that would radically change 
the aggregation device and curb its availability and utility.23  To the 
extent that the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class action has been and con-
tinues to be compromised, the national injunction fills a void that is 
worth protecting. 
Thus, it cannot be as Bray argues, that the “obvious answer” for 
when to permit an injunction that goes beyond the plaintiffs is the “class 
action.”24  Bray’s concession that “the requirements for a class action 
will not always be easy to meet”25 understates the significant hurdles 
erected over the last fifty years.  They include the Court’s heightened 
commonality requirement for class certification,26 hostility toward mon-
etary relief for (b)(2) classes,27 and deference to the enforceability of class 
action bans, within litigation and arbitration.28  The lower courts, along 
with Congress, have challenged all manner of aggregate litigation,  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 260, 266 (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts ed., 1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/workingpapers-vol2.pdf (The “single, undoubted goal  
of the [Advisory] [C]ommittee, the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, . . . was the 
firm determination to create a class action system which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly, 
segregation.”).  
 21 Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance 
Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325 (2017). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 
2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 24 Bray, supra note 1, at 475. 
 25 Id. at 476. 
 26 A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Jus-
tice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 445 (2013). 
 27 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Alexandra D. Lahav, Battered but Unbowed: A 2016 Update on 
Class Actions, 20 ANN. NAT’L INST. ON CLASS ACTIONS D-1, D-21 (2016). 
 28 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–10 (2013). 
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including issues such as the ascertainability of the class,29 standing of 
noninjured class members,30 validity of issue certification,31 and inter-
locutory appellate review of certification determinations.32 
Aggregate litigation is being undermined at the very same time Bray 
is suggesting greater dependence on it.  But the government cannot have 
it both ways.  As the availability of the class action device goes down, 
the need for the national injunction goes up.  Nor is Bray’s response to 
this dilemma satisfying.  He states: “Yet the difficulty of fitting a case 
into the classic form of a class action is a reason to favor individual 
suits, not a reason to circumvent class requirements and jump straight 
to giving what is in effect class-wide relief.”33  But the whole point of 
many class actions is that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an individ-
ual to bring the case.  With the class action device under siege, on the 
one hand, and the national injunction under attack, on the other, liti-
gants are caught in a Catch-22.  Bray may be correct to criticize the 
national injunction, but without significant change to doctrine, the so-
lution cannot be to rely on the shrinking class action as a substitute. 
II.  WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE? 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the propriety 
of the national injunction, there are numerous justifications recognized 
for its existence.  Bray finds these unsatisfactory because of their inde-
terminacy and inconsistency.  Weaving throughout these justifications, 
Bray describes, is the thread that federal judges have significant discre-
tion when determining the propriety of a national injunction.  This 
leaves litigants, according to Bray, with the unenviable task of exhorting 
judges to do the right thing (whatever that might be). 
For example, a common justification for issuing a national injunction 
is that it is necessary to provide “complete relief” to the plaintiffs.  This 
requires a judge to identify the extent of the violation, which for unlaw-
ful executive orders and regulations or unconstitutional federal statutes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debates over Ascertainability 
and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 928–39 (2017). 
 30 See Perry Cooper, Both Sides Claim Victory in Statutory Injury SCOTUS Case,  
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 17, 2016), https://www.bna.com/sides-claim-victory-n57982072511/ 
[https://perma.cc/DW55-CEMY] (discussing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), in which 
the Court held that injuries may be intangible but must be concrete and particularized). 
 31 See Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 733 (2013) (describing how appellate courts are divided over issue certification post- 
Wal-Mart). 
 32 See Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 
2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103(a) (2017). 
 33 Bray, supra note 1, at 476 (emphasis added). 
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will be national.  Bray contends the “complete relief” principle ends up 
so malleable as to not be a limiting principle at all.34 
A.  Bray’s Proposal 
Bray’s discomfort with leaving the solution in the hands of judges 
and existing doctrine leads him to craft a hard and fast rule: prohibiting 
national injunctions altogether.35  His rule’s clarity and universal 
applicability make it a tempting proposal.36  Yet, when subjected to 
further scrutiny, the rule falters.37 
As Bray notes, a major concern with his proposal is that without a 
national injunction, individuals throughout the country will be treated 
differently: courts will exempt successful plaintiffs from an unconstitu-
tional federal law or executive order, while others will continue under 
its yoke.38  He calls this “disuniformity in the law.”39  This “disuni-
formity” could just as easily be called “unfairness” or lack of law en-
forcement, characterizations I believe are far more apt here.  That some-
one’s not bringing a lawsuit justifies his being subjected to an 
unconstitutional federal law or unlawful executive order seems a trou-
blesome elevation of form over substance.40  Moreover, a court’s partial 
enforcement of an illegitimate law undermines the rule of law.41  That 
some people are left unprotected may have less to do with their sitting 
on their rights42 and more to do with their lacking the resources and 
privilege necessary to bring litigation.  It is cold comfort to those unpro-
tected individuals that the legal system already permits some measure 
of disuniformity because of our federal and state court system and fed-
eral appellate structure. 
Bray identifies the rub as a timing issue: legal issues for nonparties 
are best left for precedent to resolve.43  But the risk of irreparable harm 
that an injunction would address makes more immediate legal resolu-
tion appropriate at times. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 Id. at 466–68. 
 35 See id. at 469. 
 36 Id. at 469–73. 
 37 Bray himself addresses a number of anticipated objections.  See id. at 473–81.  I expand only 
on some. 
 38 Id. at 473–74. 
 39 Id. at 474. 
 40 See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented In-
junctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 487, 490 (2016) (referencing “unfairness”). 
 41 See Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in 
Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2033 (2015). 
 42 But see Bray, supra note 1, at 474 (justifying plaintiff’s protection because of his  
“initiative”). 
 43 See id.; see also Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 
43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 250 (2016) (comparing injunctions and precedent). 
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Bray concedes that his rule is “second best” to a standard.44  I agree.  
Despite the clarity, predictability and uniformity of a bright-line rule, a 
one-size-fits all approach sweeps too broadly.  Such a rule strips federal 
judges of their discretionary authority under Article III and is not 
required by traditional equity, which is fact-driven and contextual.  A 
standard provides the appropriate flexibility and balance of competing 
interests, while discouraging the wide-scale use of the national 
injunction. 
B.  Reasons for the National Injunction 
It may be naïve to continue to believe in judicial self-restraint and 
adherence to the “complete relief” limiting principle.  And it may be 
subject to the beholder’s eye whether an injunction must be universal 
to provide such complete relief.  However, I am not ready to say that 
national injunctions that apply to nonparties are never appropriate. 
This important conversation about the propriety of national injunc-
tions is not taking place in a vacuum.  With Congress in almost perpet-
ual gridlock and an Administration embroiled in frequent turmoil and 
controversy,45 Americans are justified in looking to the federal courts to 
safeguard our democratic principles and fundamental values.  Context 
matters. 
A rule banning all national injunctions that apply to nonparties 
would remove an important check on the executive branch of govern-
ment.  The American political system’s tripartite balance of power re-
quires a robust and effective checks-and-balances system. 
Article III judges are empowered to curb executive branch abuse of 
power.  When values counter to what many Americans aspire charac-
terize the executive branch,46 it is comforting that the federal courts have 
a method for intervening sooner rather than later. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Bray, supra note 1, at 480. 
 45 Greg Giroux, In Congress, the Center Hasn’t Held, BLOOMBERG GOV’T (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://about.bgov.com/blog/congress-center-hasnt-held/ [https://perma.cc/CJG4-SRV2] (describing 
Congressional gridlock); Aimee Ortiz, A Look at the Trump Administration’s Revolving Door,  
BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/07/31/look-trump- 
administration-revolving-door/fvLG5ibUdf8fGJIiJDeqcP/story.html  (describing sixteen appoin-
tees’ resignations or firing). 
 46 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Emma Brown & Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Plans to Min-
imize Civil Rights Efforts in Agencies, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-in-agencies/ 
2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html [https://perma.cc/R92E-8KJK] (de-
scribing policy reversals in areas of environmental justice, sexual harassment standards in educa-
tion, policing reform, voter identification laws, and LGBT issues); Donna Owens, 100 Days of Civil 
Rights in the Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2017, 9:17 AM), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/storyline/president-trumps-first-100-days/100-days-civil-rights-trump-administration- 
n752536 [https://perma.cc/8AX9-4EPX] (describing concerns about unconstitutional policing, a 
“discriminatory Muslim Ban,” “immigration roundups, a proposed Mexican border wall, [a rollback 
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CONCLUSION 
Bray contends that the “national injunction has a distortive effect on 
the decisionmaking of the federal courts and on the enactment and en-
forcement of law in the United States.”47  His Article provides a rich 
analysis of the historical context of the national injunction and offers 
one way of translating traditional equity to the current legal framework.  
He grants that that translation requires choosing between two compet-
ing ways to resolve legal questions: “quickly, comprehensively, and with 
immediate finality” or “slowly, piecemeal, and with a resolution that was 
only eventually final.”48  Acknowledging the “vices” of each, he chooses 
the latter. 
Bray grounds his choice in history.  Federal judges in the United 
States today make equitable rulings that would have been made by the 
Chancellor of England in medieval times.49  He contends that the cur-
rent American political system’s diffusion of power50 means that legal 
issues must be resolved through the “patience and the consideration of 
many minds,” thereby leaving “no room for the national injunction.”51 
But like the pervasive division of the American political system, the 
current American population is wildly diverse and pluralistic in ways 
that Bray does not fully grapple with.  This complexity makes the reso-
lution of legal claims in the United States today inherently messy.  And 
while the transsubstantive nature of federal civil process means that  
patience and percolation is required of all types of legal claims, there  
are varying degrees of propriety.  Patience has its place.  As Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr., eloquently explained in his Letter from  
Birmingham Jail in 1963: 
There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no 
longer willing to be plunged into an abyss of injustice where they experience 
the bleakness of corroding despair.  I hope . . . you can understand our le-
gitimate and unavoidable impatience.52 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of] transgender protections and voting rights”); Graham Vyse, Donald Trump’s War on Civil Rights 
Is Intensifying, NEW REPUBLIC (May 30, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/142951/donald-
trumps-war-civil-rights-intensifying [https://perma.cc/5BGD-DMTA] (Leadership Conference on 
Civil and Human Rights Head Vanita Gupta describing Trump Administration’s cost-cutting 
measures as “a rollback of civil rights across the board”). 
 47 Bray, supra note 1, at 481. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 426–27. 
 50 Id. at 482. 
 51 Id. 
 52 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in WHY WE 
CAN’T WAIT 77 (1964). 
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Dr. King’s letter (to which Bray seems to allude53), reminds us that jus-
tice delayed can often be justice denied when it comes to claims of sys-
temic discrimination. 
Admittedly, all legal claims — including those alleging widespread 
discrimination and violations of fundamental constitutional rights — 
must traverse the well-trodden path of a resolution system that highly 
values incrementalism.  Indeed, the seminal Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion54 was the result of a deliberate and brilliant campaign to slowly 
chip away at the separate but equal doctrine through decades of prece-
dents.  But my guess is that for the beneficiaries of Brown overturning 
de jure segregation couldn’t come fast enough.55 
What Bray’s Article overlooks, then, is that the current legal land-
scape is fraught with danger to the rule of law and to the very members 
of society that that law was meant to protect.56  As tempting as a bright-
line rule against national injunctions may be, it raises a number of con-
cerns.  Such a rule is not required by traditional equity in a system no 
longer governed by a single Chancellor.  And Bray’s proposal would 
ultimately undermine Article III judges’ discretion to act more urgently 
and craft remedies more broadly when appropriate. 
It is true that a national injunction — which lacks decades of prece-
dent and the benefit of a full-blown record from which to gauge the 
merits — is hardly the ideal way to establish law and bind nonparties.  
But one should not let perfect be the enemy of the good.  Traditional 
equity can be translated to our modern legal system in a way that makes 
room for a judicial course correction, not only for the few plaintiffs for-
tunate enough to be able to bring suit, but for everyone who may be 
suffering under the current regime.  Many of the current administra-
tion’s executive orders target the most vulnerable populations in our 
society — including various minorities, immigrants, and children.  The 
nature of many of the rights at issue is precisely what traditional equity 
was designed to protect — justice.  I believe the Chancellor would be 
proud.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 See Bray, supra note 1, at 482. 
 54 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 55 See Brown, 349 U.S. at 301 (noting that resistance to Brown, 347 U.S. 483, necessitated the 
Court’s directing district courts to enter orders consistent with Brown “with all deliberate speed”). 
 56 See, e.g., Hate Crime Statistics, 2015, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015 (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2017). 
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